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their
of cybersecurity and cyberattacks,
people think
hen most probably
turns to privacy violations and theft of
attention
personal information-invasions of personal security. This is natural
given well-publicized incidents in recent years, including the data
breaches of personal information from customers of national retail
businesses such as Target and Home Depot, as well as large banks.'
These are harmful incidents, to be sure, and incidents like these affect
millions of people. However, there are more serious threats with the
potential to cause damage beyond the individual level. Without a
doubt, invasions of privacy, including breaches of personal health and
financial records, are serious matters. Nonetheless, there are dangers
with the potential to cause great harm to national and societal
security. Cyberattacks involve more than theft of information; they
can damage or destroy property, which in turn can lead to loss of life
(perhaps even large-scale loss of life). This is especially true for
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attacks on systems that are designated as critical infrastructure.2 This
Article addresses the issue of cybersecurity and threats to critical
infrastructure from individuals, nation-states, and/or groups of
individuals (working on behalf of or independently of nation-states).
To understand the threat, several recent events deserve attention.
On December 23, 2015, a control center in western Ukraine lost
control of the electrical power grid for that region. 3 A cyberattack
shut down the substations despite the efforts of the operators to regain
control of their computer network.4 One operator's computer logged
him out of the system and prevented him from regaining entry.5 The
computer then proceeded to shut down about thirty substations.6 The
attackers struck two other power distribution centers at the same time
and disabled backup power supplies. 7 More than 230,000 people lost
power in the dead of winter. This was the first confirmed cyberattack
that shut down a power grid.8 According to the investigation
following the attack, the attack was planned over many months. 9 The
hackers conducted reconnaissance to study the networks and access
operator credentials, and then they launched a synchronized assault. 10
One of the investigators (a former cyberwarfare operations officer in
the U.S. Air Force) noted the sophistication in logistics, planning, and
operation." Although the identity of the cyberattackers is uncertain,
Ukraine blamed Russia for the attack. 12 What should cause concern
2 The language used to describe these threats is not particularly helpful in encouraging
an examination of the distinction between personal threats versus national/societal threats.
The terms "cybersecurity" and "cyberattacks" are used loosely and describe a wide range
of activity (from annoying to criminal, committed by actors ranging from lone hackers to
nation-states). "Cybersecurity is also sometimes conflated inappropriately in public
discussion with other concepts such as privacy, information sharing, intelligence
gathering, and surveillance." ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43831,
CYBERSECURITY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES: IN BRIEF 1 (2016).

3 Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine's Power Grid,
WIRED (Mar. 3, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unpre
cedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/.
4 Id.
6 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. Russia is also suspected of conducting a cyberattack on Estonia's critical
infrastructure in 2007. The attack shut down Estonia's banking system, telephone
connections, and television networks. See Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating CyberSecurity, 107 Nw. U.L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2013).
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for Americans is that the Ukrainian cybercontrol systems were
thought to be stronger and more secure than the systems in place for
many power grids in the United States.
It appears that the attack on the Ukrainian power grid was not
intended to result in permanent damage. It may have been conducted
to send a message. If that was the case, Ukraine was fortunate.
A cyber-attack on the power grid would be truly catastrophic. The
industrial control, or SCADA, systems used by power plants and
other utilities are increasingly connected to the Internet. Hackers
could exploit this connectivity to disrupt power generation and
leave tens of millions of people in the dark for months. They could
even destroy key system components like turbines. 13
The attack on the Ukrainian power grid may have been exceptional
only insofar as its effectiveness. There are reports that electric utilities
are probed thousands of times each month by hackers and that nationstates designed plans for attacking the power grids of other
countries. 14
In 2016, another group of hackers stole $81 million from the
Bangladesh Central Bank.1 5 There is speculation that the hackers
breached the Bank's network, which was made possible by a lack of
firewall protection. 16 The money was transferred into the accounts of
casinos in the Philippines; from there, the money disappeared. 17 A
central bank is a nation-state's bank. This was a theft from the
13 Sales, supra note 12, at 1514. A report from the Congressional Research Service
states,
attacks on industrialcontrol systems can result in the destruction or disruption of
the equipment they control, such as generators, pumps, and centrifuges. Most
cyberattacks have limited impacts, but a successful attack on some components
of critical infrastructure (CI)-most of which is held by the private sector--could
have significant effects on national security, the economy, and the livelihood and
safety of individual citizens.
FISCHER, supra note 2, at 2-3.

14 See Scott J. Shackelford et al., Sustainable Cybersecurity: Applying Lessons from the
Green Movement to Managing Cyber Attacks, 2016 U. ILL. L. REv. 1995, 2005-06 (2016)
[hereinafter Shackelford et al., Sustainable Cybersecurity]. The New York Times recently

reported that North Korea may acquire the capability to launch a cyberattack on the United
States' power grid. See David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, Trump Inherits a Secret
Cyberwar on North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2017, at Al.
15 See Kim Zetter, That Insane, $81M Bangladesh Bank Heist? Here's What We Know,

WIRED (May 17, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/05/insane-81m-bangla
desh-bank-heist-heres-know/.
16

Id.

17 See Michael Corkery, An $81 Million Sneak Attack on the World Banking System,

N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2016, at Al.
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government of Bangladesh. Many were surprised that a nation-state
could be the victim of this kind of cybertheft.
A more recent, widespread attack on critical infrastructure occurred
in May 2017. Using malicious software known as WannaCry, hackers
engaged in a cyberattack that affected Internet-linked networks in
dozens of countries.' 8 Among its effects, the attack shut down access
to patient files in Britain's National Health Service and many of its
hospitals.1 9 The attacks also affected the Russian Interior Ministry,
the German rail system, European telecommunications companies,
and a Chinese airline. 2 0 WannaCry is a type of ransomware-a
malicious program that encrypts files, folders, and drives on a
computer. 2 ' Once the ransomware is in place, the hackers demand
payment of a ransom for a key to unlock the encryption.2 2
Ransomware attacks are common, but the WannaCry attack attracted
wide attention because the victims were located all over the world and
were high profile, sophisticated institutions at the heart of critical
infrastructure systems. 23
Just a month later, in June 2017, another ransomware attack, which
was described as an improved and more dangerous version of
WannaCry, affected critical infrastructure systems around the
world.24 The attack caused the shutdown of bank ATMs in Ukraine,
the disruption of payment mechanisms on the Kiev metro, and the
shutdown of all computers at a Ukrainian electrical power company. 25
The attack then spread beyond Ukraine. The attack caused a Russian
bank to close all its offices, forced hospitals in Pennsylvania to cancel
operations, and demanded ransom from a chocolate factory in
Australia.26 As if further demonstration was necessary to prove the
18 See Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, Hackers Use Tool Taken From NSA. in
Global Attack, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2017, at Al; see generally Electronic Bandits,
ECONOMIST, May 2017, at 70.
19 Russell Goldman, Ransomware: How Hackers Hold Data Hostage, N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 2017, at A9.
20 Id.
21 See ElectronicBandits, supra note 18.
22 Id.
23 Id.

24 See Nicole Perlroth et al., Cyberattack Hits Ukraine, Then Spreads, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 2017, at Al.
25 Id.

26 Id. The cyberattack also affected the operations of Maersk, one of the largest ocean
freight transport companies. Maersk estimated that it lost as much as $300 million as a
result of the loss of business caused by the attack. See Jordan Novet, Shipping Company
Maersk Says June Cyberattack Could Cost It up to $300 Million, CNBC (Aug. 16, 2017,
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prevalence and potential dangers posed by cyberattacks, July 2017
brought several media reports of attacks on electric utilities in the
United States.27 The most notable instance was an attempt to breach
the network at a nuclear power plant in Kansas.2 8 According to
government agencies, public safety was never in danger. Nonetheless,
these reports confirm the constant threat to critical infrastructure
systems.
Nation-states themselves conduct cyberattacks. The United States
has reportedly conducted cyberattacks on North Korea to damage its
nuclear missile program.2 9 In the past few years, a large number of
North Korea's rockets have unexpectedly exploded, veered off
course, or disintegrated in midair and plunged into the sea. 3 0 Some
observers believe that such failures are the result of American
cyberattacks, but this has not been confirmed, and some doubt
31
America has the capability to cause such failures. A more widely
known cyberattack occurred with the use of the Stuxnet virus, which
damaged Iran's nuclear program. In June 2009, someone introduced a
destructive digital worm into the computer network controlling Iran's
nuclear enrichment program. 3 2 Stuxnet was the "world's first real
cyberweapon.33 'Unlike other worms or viruses, Stuxnet did not
simply hijack targeted computers or steal information; it physically
destroyed equipment controlled by the computers.3 4 Stuxnet
physically destroyed hundreds of centrifuges, which are necessary
pieces of equipment to make nuclear weapons. It is widely assumed
2:04 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/16/maersk-says-notpetya-cyberattack-could
-cost-300-million.html.
27 See, e.g., Nicole Perlroth, Hackers Are Targeting Nuclear Plants, U.S. Says, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 2017, at B5 (While the reports were published in July 2017, it is unclear
when the attacks occurred.).
28 See id.

29 See Sanger & Broad, supra note 14.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 See Kim Zetter, How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing
Malware in History, WIRED (July 11, 2011, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2011/07
/how-digital-detectives-deciphered-stuxnet/.
3 3 Id.

34 See Kim Zetter, An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World's First Digital
Weapon, WIRED (Nov. 3, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/1 1/countdown-to
-zero-day-stuxnet/.
35 See id. "Centrifuges are large cylindrical tubes-connected by pipes in a
configuration known as a 'cascade'-that spin at supersonic speed to separate isotopes in
uranium gas for use in nuclear power plants and weapons." Id. The centrifuges were
governed by a control system supplied-by Siemans, a large German industrial/technology
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that Stuxnet was developed by the United States and Israel, although
that has never been publicly confirmed.3 6
The shutdown of a power grid, the theft of millions of dollars from
a central bank, and the attacks on nuclear weapons programs share a
common thread-they all were cyberattacks on a country's critical
infrastructure. The threats are real, not hypothetical, and exist today,
not somewhere in the future. Cyberattackers possess the capability to
cause oil spills (by attacking pipelines or refineries), power generator
explosions, train derailments, airplane crashes, and missile
detonations. The vital roles that critical infrastructure systems play
in the necessary functions of a society means that any disruption or
damage could cripple it. The Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of
2001 defines critical infrastructure (CI) as the "systems and assets,
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the
incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national
public health or safety, or any combination of those matters." 3 8 The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) adopts this definition as
well.39 DHS identified sixteen critical infrastructure sectors. They are
the (1) chemical sector; (2) commercial facilities sector; (3)
communications sector; (4) critical manufacturing sector; (5) dams
sector; (6) defense industrial base sector; (7) emergency services
sector; (8) energy sector; (9) financial services sector; (10) food and
agriculture sector; (11) government facilities sector; (12) healthcare
and public health sector; (13) information technology sector; (14)
nuclear reactors, materials and waste sector; (15) transportation
systems sector; and (16) water and wastewater systems sector.40
Cybersecurity threats to critical infrastructure have the potential to (1)
cripple or destroy an individual business; (2) cripple or destroy the
ability to provide basic public services on a local, regional, or national
firm (the controller is called the Process Control System 7). See William J. Broad et al.,
Israel Tests Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at Al.
Stuxnet targeted and took over control of the Siemans controllers, which in turn caused the
centrifuges to spin at a rate that caused them to physically destruct. Id.
36 See Broad et al., supra note 35.

37 See RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NExT THREAT
TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 70 (2010).
38 Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001, 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2012).
39 U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., What is Critical Infrastructure?, HOMELAND

SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure (last updated July 12, 2017).
4 U.S.

Dep't of Homeland

Sec.,

Critical Infrastructure Sectors, HOMELAND

SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors
2017).

(last updated July 11,
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scale; and (3) cause loss of property or even loss of life, perhaps on a
catastrophic scale. Cyberattacks on CI have occurred and continue to
occur. CI is particularly at risk because most of it is owned by the
private sector, with private owners utilizing different security
practices.4 1
Electric power grids, communications networks, air traffic control
systems, maritime navigation systems, and bank payment systems are
just a few examples of CI owned by the private sector. Everyone
depends on these systems for safety, health, and welfare. Typically,
one would expect the government to be in charge of protecting
systemically crucial systems. For example, people do not expect the
private sector to provide an army or a navy. But most CI systems are
provided by private entities that are responsible for protecting their
own systems. While some cyberattacks are personally intrusive and
violate privacy, this Article addresses the kinds of cyberattacks that
can cause catastrophic loss of life and property, and it discusses the
consequences of the fact that most CI systems are privately owned.
Most cyberattacks have limited impacts, but a successful attack on
some components of critical infrastructure (Cl)-most of which is
held by the private sector-could have significant effects on national
security, the economy, and the livelihood and safety of individual
citizens. Thus, a rare successful attack with high impact can ose a
larger risk than a common successful attack with low impact.4
The aviation industry provides an illustration of systemic
vulnerabilities that have analogues in a wide range of CI systems.
Aviation relies on interconnected networks of electronic systems. An
airport relies on such networks to operate its security, power, fueling,
and aircraft maintenance systems.4 3 The air traffic control system
relies on Internet Protocol (IP) networking to communicate. 44 The
operation of an aircraft depends upon systems connected to multiple
networks. 4 5 A passenger jet is vulnerable to interference with its flight
41 Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Bugs in the Market: Creating a Legitimate,
Transparent, and Vendor-FocusedMarket for Software Vulnerabilities, 58 ARIZ. L. REV.
753, 767 (2016).
42 FISCHER, supra note 2, at 3.
43 See Andrew V. Schmidt, Note, Cyberterrorism:Combating the Aviation Industry's
Vulnerability to Cyberattack, 39 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 169, 187 (2016).
44 Id. at 188-89.
45 See generally INT'L GRP. OF EXPERTS, TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE
INTERNATIONAL LAw APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 259 (Michael N. Schmitt ed.,

2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]. The predecessor of the Tallinn Manual
2.0 was published in 2013. It was called the Tallinn Manual on the InternationalLaw
Applicable to Cyber Warfare, and was the "product of a three-year project by twenty
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control systems and its onboard navigation and communications
46
systems. A Boeing 777 has over three million parts produced by
500 suppliers, and many of these parts are linked through electronic
networks connected to the Internet.47 Anything connected to the
Internet is exposed to cyberattack.4 8 Points of connection pose
renowned international law scholars and practitioners" and "identifies the international law
applicable to cyber warfare and sets out ninety-five 'black-letter rules' governing such
conflicts." INT'L GRP. OF EXPERTS, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW

APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE, at opening page (Michael Schmitt ed. 2013)
[hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL]. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 supersedes the Tallinn Manual.
See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra, at 1-2.
46 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 45, at 259.
47 Scott J. Shackelford & Scott Russell, Above the Cloud: Enhancing Cybersecurity in
the Aerospace Sector, 10 FRI L. REv. 635, 641 (2015) [hereinafter Shackelford & Russell,
Above the Cloud].
48 See Peter Haynes & Thomas A. Campbell, Hacking the Internet of Everything, SCI.
AM. (Aug. 1, 2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/hacking-internet-of-every
thing/. Generally, devices are connected to the Internet through servers, including web
servers.
Internet servers make the Internet possible. All of the machines on the Internet
are either servers or clients. The machines that provide services to other
machines are servers. And the machines that are used to connect to those services
are clients. There are Web servers, e-mail servers, FTP servers and so on serving
the needs of Internet users all over the world.
Jeff Tyson, How Internet Infrastructure Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, https://computer.how
stuffworks.com/internet/basics/internet-infrastructure9.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
The web server is comprised of the hardware, operating system, web server software,
TCP/IP protocols and site content, which together enable delivery of information from the
Internet to the browser. Definition of Web Server, PCMAG., http://www.pcmag.com
/encyclopedia/term/54342/web-server (last visited Nov. 5, 2017). Attacks on web servers
are a common form of cyberattack. Cyber Security, BERKELEY LAB, https://commons
.1bl.gov/display/cpp/Web+Server+Requirement%3A+OS+and+Application
(last visited
Nov. 5, 2017). The Federal Communications Commission issued a warning to small
businesses about attacks on web servers: "Web servers, which host the data and other
content available to your customers on the Internet, are often the most targeted and
attacked components of a company's network." FCC, CYBER SECURITY PLANNING GUIDE
WS-1 (2012), https://transition.fcc.gov/cyber/cyberplanner.pdf.
The following are examples of specific security threats to web servers:
* Cyber criminals may exploit software bugs in the web server, underlying
operating system, or active content to gain unauthorized access to the web
server. Examples of unauthorized access include gaining access to files or
folders that were not meant to be publicly accessible and being able to
execute commands and/or install malicious software on the web server.
* Denial-of-service attacks may be directed at the web server or its
supporting network infrastructure to prevent or hinder your website users
from making use of its services. This can include preventing the user from
accessing email, websites, online accounts or other services. The most
common attack occurs when the attacker floods a network with
information, so that it can't process the user's request.
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vulnerabilities and require cybersecurity defenses. The potential exists
to endanger a single aircraft or even the air traffic control system
through a cyberbreach. 9
A basic challenge in cybersecurity is the fact that approximately
eighty-five percent of America's CI is owned by the private sector.o
The CI systems are owned and operated by thousands of businesses,
which in turn may have thousands more private entities who either
supply, service, or access the CI systems. The national cybersecurity
framework relies on private actors to invest in a sufficient amount of
cybersecurity measures to avoid catastrophic damage to CI. However,
few private entities are required by law to implement any particular
level of cybersecurity.5 1 Thus, it is not surprising that many experts
* Sensitive information on the web server may be read or modified without
authorization.
* Sensitive information on backend databases that are used to support
interactive elements of a web application may be compromised through
the injection of unauthorized software commands. Examples include
Structured Query Language (SQL) injection, Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (LDAP) injection and cross-site scripting (XSS).
* Sensitive unencrypted information transmitted between the web server
and the browser may be intercepted.
* Information on the web server may be changed for malicious purposes.
Website defacement is a commonly reported example of this threat.
* Cyber criminals may gain unauthorized access to resources elsewhere in
the organization's network via a successful attack on the web server.
* Cyber criminals may also attack external entities after compromising a
web server. These attacks can be launched directly (e.g., from the
compromised server against an external server) or indirectly (e.g., placing
malicious content on the compromised web server that attempts to exploit
vulnerabilities in the web browsers of users visiting the site).
* The server may be used as a distribution point for attack tools,
pornography or illegally copied software.
Id.
49 With such dangers in mind, the German military launched a new cybersecurity
initiative in 2017 to protect its aviation system. Andrea Shalal, German Military Aviation
Command Launches Cyber Threat Initiative, REUTERS (July 12, 2017, 11:12 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-military-cyber-aviation-idUSKBN19X2J6
?utm source-twitter&utm medium=Social. The initiative was motivated, in part, by a
demonstration of a hacker's ability to take control of an aircraft, and the industry's
adoption of communication protocols similar to those used on the internet to connect
cockpits, cabins and ground controls, which expose air traffic to vulnerabilities. Id.
50 See Sales, supra note 12, at 1506.
51 Id. One important exception applies to private firms that contract with the
Department of Defense (DOD) in certain situations. For example, the DOD published an
interim final rule, which requires contractors to comply with certain cybersecurity
requirements specified by the National Institute for Standards and Technology. Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Network Penetration Reporting and
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describe the state of cybersecurity defenses for CI as "inadequate." 5 2
The government does not impose security requirements, leaving it to
the private-sector entities to set their own practices and policies for
protecting their computer systems. 53
At this point, a summary of statutory definitions and loose,
working definitions is necessary. This Article uses the term
"cyberspace" to mean "the interdependent network of information
technology
infrastructures,
and
includes
the
Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded
processors and controllers in critical industries." 5 4 "Cybersecurity" is
used generally to mean (1) "[a] set of activities and other measures
intended to protect-from attack, disruption, or other threatscomputers, computer networks, related hardware and devices
software and the information they contain and communicate,
including software and data, as well as other elements of cyberspace";
(2) "[t]he state or quality of being protected from threats"; and (3)
"[t]he broad field of endeavor aimed at implementing and improving
those activities and quality." 55 This Article also adopts the definition
of "cyberattack" used by the United States military:
A hostile act using computer or related networks or systems, and

intended to disrupt and/or destroy an adversary's critical cyber
systems, assets, or functions. The intended effects of cyber attack
are not necessarily limited to the targeted computer systems or data
themselves-for instance, attacks on computer systems which are
intended to degrade or destroy infrastructure .... A cyber attack

may use intermediate delivery vehicles including peripheral
devices,

electronic

transmitters,

embedded

code,

or human

Contracting for Cloud Services,. 80 Fed. Reg. 51,739 (effective Aug. 26, 2015) (interim
rule). The National Institute for Standards and Technology and its role in cybersecurity is
discussed in Part II. This particular requirement has the goal of safeguarding access to the
Cloud by contractors. Id.
52 See Sales, supra note 12, at 1506.
53 Id.
54 See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD-54
3 (Jan. 8, 2008), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-54.pdf (so defining).
55 FISCHER, supra note 2, at 1. There is no agreed upon meaning of the term; it serves
more as a loose reference. See David Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity.Regulation, 30
GA. ST. U. L. REv. 287, 291 (2014) ("there is surprising disagreement" as to precise
definitions). A similar working definition of cybersecurity is "the policy field concerned
with managing cyber threats, including unauthorized access, disruption, and modification
of electronically stored information, software, hardware, services, and networks." Scott J.
Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?: Exploring the.
Implications of the 2014 NIST CybersecurityFrameworkon Shaping ReasonableNational
and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX. INT'L L.J. 305, 311-12 (2015)
[hereinafter Shackelford et al., Global Cybersecurity].
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operators. The activation or effect of a cyber attack may be widely
separated temporally and geographically from delivery. 56

The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA) also

.

sets forth important definitions. It defines "cybersecurity purpose"
to mean "the purpose of protecting an information system or
information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an
information system from a cybersecurity threat or security
vulnerability."5 8 It also defines "cybersecurity threat" to mean
an action, not protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, on or through an information system that may
result in an unauthorized effort to adversely impact the security,
availability, confidentiality, or integrity of an information system or
information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an
information system. 59
Part I of this Article explains that cybersecurity protection of CI is
a "public good." This is important because a market economy faces
inherent barriers to providing public goods. In general, public goods
are things or situations that provide a widespread benefit available to
all. The economic problem they pose, however, is that any person
providing a public good is unable to capture the full economic benefit
or profit of providing the good. This means there is little economic or
profit incentive to do so, which results in the less than optimal supply
of such goods. This conundrum describes the problem in protecting
CI. Part II presents an overview of the state of America's
cybersecurity laws and the government's efforts to promote strong
cybersecurity for CI. The government's approach is to encourage
voluntary responses by the private sector to improve cybersecurity (in
contrast to imposing mandates). Part III explains why the government
has chosen a voluntary approach in this area and discusses reasons
why such an approach is rational and/or desirable. However, there are
significant problems with this approach. Thus, Part IV discusses the
disadvantages of relying on voluntary efforts by the private sector to
provide a public good. A major problem is the significant market
disincentive to any private entity that is in a position to supply a
public good. The market is unable to provide a profit incentive to a
56 Memorandum from James E. Cartwright, Gen., United States Marine Corps and Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations to
Chiefs of the Military Services (2010), http://www.nsci-va.org/CyberReferenceLib/2010
-1 l-joint%2OTerminology/20for/20Cyberspace%200perations.pdf.
57 6 U.S.C. § 1501 (2012) (effective Dec. 18, 2015).
58 Id. § 1501(4).
59 Id. § 1501(5)(A).
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private supplier of a public good because the supplier generally
cannot capture the profit/benefit of public goods they supply. This
results in market failure-the inability of a free market to supply the
optimal amount of a public good.6 0 Market failures for public goods
have traditionally been addressed by government-based solutions.6 1
In line with this approach, Part V presents a modest proposal to
improve cybersecurity based on expanding already established
subsidies to encourage and facilitate additional spending on
cybersecurity by private entities. A few summary observations are set
forth in the Conclusion.
I
CYBERSECURITY AND PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
AS A PUBLIC GOOD

Protection of CI from cyberattacks is a matter of national security.
The Department of Homeland Security makes that clear in its
definition of CI. President Obama described cybersecurity as "one of
the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as
a nation. 62 This challenge is due to the increasingly important role of
the Internet for personal, business, and government use. The Internet
is inseparable from numerous CI systems and is in itself CI. 63

60 See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons

Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 929-30 (2005) (discussing market failure for
infrastructure).
61 Id. at 925.

62 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Cybersecurity and
Consumer Protection Summit (Feb. 13, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the
-press-office/2015/02/13/remarks-president-cybersecurity-and-consumer-protection-sum
mit.
63 See Frischmann, supra note 60, at 920.
The Internet meets all three demand-side criteria for infrastructure. The
Internet infrastructure is a partially (non)rival good; it is consumed both
nonrivalrously and rivalrously, depending upon available capacity. The benefits
of the Internet are realized at the ends. Like a road system, a lake, and basic
research, the Internet is socially valuable primarily because of the productive
activity it facilitates downstream. That is, end-users hooked up to the Internet
infrastructure generate value and realize benefits through the applications run on
their computers and through the consumption of content delivered over the
Internet .

. .

. The Internet currently is a mixed commercial, public, and social

infrastructure.
Id. at 1006.
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National security (which includes cybersecurity protection of CI) is
a public good.64 A public good is a thing or condition that benefits all
members of a society.6 5 Infrastructure, in all forms, generates public
goods.6 6 To use the scholarly jargon, a public good is something that
is both nonexcludable and nonrivalrous.6 7 A good is nonexcludable if

6 Public Goods - The Economic Lowdown Podcast Series, Episode 17, FED. RES.
BANK ST. LOUIS, https://www.stlouisfed.org/education/economic-lowdown-podcast-series
/episode-17-public-goods (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Public Goods Podcast].
65 See Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Public and Private Goods, LEGAL
THEORY BLOG, (June 19, 2016, 10:47 AM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2016
/06/legal-theory-lexicon-public-and-private-goods.html
(explaining that "[t]he phrase
'public good' or 'public goods shall be used . .. to refer to the economists' idea of goods
(in the broad sense that includes both 'goods' and 'services')").
6 See Frischmann, supra note 60, at 931-32.
67 See Public Goods Podcast, supra note 64; see also Solum, supra note 65. Solum
provides:
There are two criteria by which public goods are distinguished from private
goods. A good is public only if it is both nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. A
good is private only if it is both rivalrous and excludable. (We will deal with the
mixed cases in just a bit.)
"Rivalrousness" is a property of the consumption of a good. Consumption of a
good is rivalrous if consumption by one individual X diminished the opportunity
of other individuals, Y, Z, etc., to consume the good. Some goods are rivalrous
because they are "used up." If I drink a glass of Heitz Martha's Vineyard, then
you cannot drink that same glass of wine. If I set off a firecracker, you cannot set
off the same firecracker. Other goods are rivalrous because of crowding effects.
If I am using the free internet terminal at the student lounge, then you cannot use
the same time slice of the terminal-because only one person can sit in front of
the screen at the same time.
"Excludability" is also a property of consumption of a good. It is helpful to
distinguish two forms of excludability: (1) excludability through self help, and
(2) excludability through law. If I want to exclude you from my land, I can build
a fence-the exclusion results from self help. But if I want to exclude you from
copying a novel that I've written and I want to make the novel generally
available for sale, self help will not work. (It would be ridiculously expensive to
hire a guard to monitor each copy or every photocopy machine.) Government,
however, can make unauthorized copying a criminal offense or actionable civil
wrong, thereby creating exclusion through law.
Solum, supra note 65.
Nonrivalry is a key economic concept that one must appreciate when
analyzing social welfare from a utilitarian perspective. Synonymous with
indivisibility of benefits, nonrivalry describes the situation "when a unit of [a]
good can be consumed by one individual without detracting, in the slightest,
from the consumption opportunities still available to others from that same unit."
For economists, "consumption" simply refers to the realization of benefits by
virtue of one's access to the good.
Frischmann, supra note 60, at 942 (quoting RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE
THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 8 (1996)).
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one is unable to prevent others from consuming or using it.6 8 A good
is nonrivalrous if one person's consumption does not negatively affect
anyone else's consumption of the good. 6 9 The benefit accrues to each
individual whether he pays for it or not and is not diminished by
anyone else's enjoyment or consumption. The phrase "public good" is
not limited to things that physically exist; it includes services and
intangible benefits. To illustrate, the eradication of a disease is a
nonexcludable good because one is unable to prevent others from
benefiting from it. Nice weather is a nonrivalrous good because one
person's enjoyment of the weather does not mean there is less nice
weather for others. By contrast, a pie is not a public good. One is able
to prevent others from eating the pie, so it does not possess the
characteristic of nonexcludability. The pie also does not qualify as a
nonrivalrous good because if one person eats the pie, no one else can.
An often-used example of a public good is national security.
National security is nonexcludable because if another country tried to
invade California, the military would act to protect it regardless of
whether individual Californian citizens paid their taxes.7 1 It is

nonrivalrous because one person's use of the public good does not
68 See Solum, supra note 65.
69 Id.
70 Professor Solum explains,

* Public goods have two characteristics-nonrivalrousness and nonexcludability.
For example, consumption of national defense is nonrivalrous (my being
protected by the U.S. armed forces doesn't diminish your protection). National
defense is a nonexcludable good: the Army cannot say to Mexico, "Solum hasn't
paid his national defense bill, Go ahead and attack him."
' Private goods are rivalrous and excludable. If I own a laptop computer, my use
of it diminishes your ability to use it; therefore, my consumption of the laptop
rivals yours. Moreover, I can exclude you from the use of my laptop (by locking
it up when I am not using it).

Id.
National security is an example of a public good. We all benefit from this
government service with hardly a second thought. We pay our taxes to the
government, and the government uses part of those funds to defend the country
from foreign and domestic threats. National security is nonexcludable because
there is no way of withholding protection from those who don't pay taxes. If a
missile were heading for the country, the military would shoot it down to save
everyone in its path, regardless of who did and didn't pay their taxes. National
defense is nonrival because one person's use of it does not hinder anyone else's
consumption. For example, as the population grows, more people benefit from
national security, but the level of protection for those already benefiting remains
the same.
Public Goods Podcast,supra note 64.
71 See PublicGoods Podcast, supra note 64.
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hinder anyone else's consumption; one person's enjoyment of
national security does not mean there is less protection for others.7 2
National security is provided by the federal government at taxpayer
A general
expense. Governments usually supply public goods.
principle of economics (and related legal theory) is that markets
should provide private goods and government should provide public
goods.7 4 The reason for this is explained by economic theory.
Economic theory states that no rational person will voluntarily pay
for a public good as long as someone else does. An individual eiijoys
clean air as long as someone else pays for the cost of clean air. An
American within the United States is protected by America's
antimissile defenses whether she pays taxes or not. This is the classic
"free rider" problem.7 5 Another aspect of this problem is that the free
rider enjoys as much of the public good as someone who pays for it.
Because no rational individual will voluntarily pay for a public good,
societies turn to government to pay for public goods through taxes.
72 Id.
73 Id.

74 See Solum, supra note 65.
75 Public Goods Podcast, supranote 64.
Free riders are the consumers who don't pay in order to consume the public
good. Since public goods are free, most consumers become free riders because
they have no incentive to pay the supplier. After all, consumers have a budget, so
they won't likely pay for a good if they can get it for free. While there may be
people who recognize the importance of a public good and have enough money
to donate voluntarily, they form the exception to the rule. In general, people will
not pay willingly for a public good.
If a private business supplied a public good, most people would consume the
product for free. Since it is nonexcludable and nonrival, consumers can already
get the full benefits without paying anything. They won't likely donate much, if
any, of their hard-earned cash. Hence, the company won't make much money.
That's why private firms won't produce public goods; there's no reward. Firms
instead spend their time and resources producing private goods because people
do have to pay for those, allowing the firm to sell them for a profit.
Id.
Some products, like national defense or police services, will not be produced in
private markets because of what is called the "free-rider" problem. These
products, called "public goods," have the unique character that consumption of
them by one consumer does not diminish the possibility of consumption by
another consumer. As a result, public goods must be purchased by the
government if they are to be purchased at all. Otherwise, every consumer will
attempt to become a free rider by waiting for someone else to purchase the.
product so that it can be used for free. Government regulation concerning the
method and collection of taxes ensures that each citizen pays a share of the cost
of governmental purchases of public goods.
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 15 (6th ed. 2014).
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In addition to the free rider problem, economic externalities also
present an obstacle to the private sector providing goods. An
economic externality is a cost generated by an activity that is not
borne by the person or firm who engages in the activity. 76 An
economic externality may also be described as "an effect on the
market the source of which is external to the market.", 7 It is "the
imposition of a cost or benefit on a nonconsenting third party" by the
party engaging in the economic activity.7

Externalities can be either positive or negative. "Positive
externalities occur whenever an activity generates benefits that the
actor is unable to internalize," such as through prices; "[n]egative
externalities occur when one's activity imposes costs on others" that
likewise are not transmitted through prices. Economic theory
predicts that the market will oversupply negative externalities
relative to socially optimal levels "because the producer will
internalize all benefits of the activity but not all the costs." It also
predicts that the market will undersupply positive externalities
because third parties will free ride. Externalities thus represent a
form of market failure. The standard government response to a
negative externality is to discourage the responsible conduct (e.g.,
with taxation or regulation); the standard response to a positive
externality, is to encourage the responsible conduct (e.g., with a
subsidy).7 9
To illustrate, smoke from a factory chimney that blankets the
surrounding area is a negative externality because it is a harm
suffered by nonconsenting third parties caused by the economic
activity of the factory.8 0 Absent government intervention, the factory
owner does not bear the cost imposed on others. In contrast, a worldfamous museum that attracts visitors from around the world generates
positive externalities. However, the museum is unable to capture the
benefit that surrounding businesses enjoy for free (such as increased
76 See Solum, supra note 65.
77 See Sales, supra note 12, at 1519 (quoting Niva Elkin-Koren & Eli M. Salzberger,
Law and Economics in Cyberspace, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 553, 563 (1999)).
78 Id. at 1520.
79 Id.
80 An administrative law treatise states:

If a manufacturing process, for example, produces toxic vapors that make
persons ill, the manufacturer should pay for the medical expenses of those
persons and include them as part of the price for which the product is sold. If the
manufacturer does not pay those costs, the product will be overproduced. There
will be more demand for the product than if it were sold at a higher price that
reflected the damages its production caused.
PIERCE, JR. ET AL., supra note 75, at 15.
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tourism and higher real estate prices) due to their proximity to the
museum (absent government intervention).8 1
. The protection of CI from cyberattacks presents a set of difficult
problems. Protection of CI is a matter of national security and
defense. It is a public good that benefits all. However, the government
relies on private owners of CI to provide the public good even though
there is little economic incentive to do so. Of course, self-protection
provides an incentive to invest in cybersecurity, but the problem of
externalities prevents the optimal amount of investment. In sum, the
government looks to private businesses to provide a significant
amount of national security. Approximately eighty-five percent of
America's CI is owned by the private sector. 82 Despite the necessity
of protecting CI, the government generally does not impose
mandatory cybersecurity requirements or provide financial support
for cybersecurity investment.8 3
Cyber-security can be understood in these terms. If a company
suffers an intrusion, much of the harm will fall on third parties; the
attack results in a negative externality. It can be extraordinarily
difficult to internalize these costs. The class of persons affected by
the intrusion will often be so large that it would be prohibitively
expensive to use market exchanges to internalize the resulting
externalities; the transaction costs are simply too great. Nor can tort
law internalize the costs, as firms generally do not face liability for
harms that result from cyber-attacks on their systems or products.
Because many companies do not bear these costs, they ignore them
when deciding how much to spend on cyber-defense and therefore
tend to underinvest relative to socially optimal levels. (This is true
both of companies that produce computer products, such as
software manufacturers, and companies that use them, such as ISPs
and utility companies.) Cyber-security also involves positive
externalities. A company that secures itself against intruders makes
it harder for assailants to commandeer its systems to attack others.
Investments in cyber-defense thus effectively subsidize other firms.
Because the investing company doesn't capture the full benefit of
81 In short, many other parties (including unidentifiable parties), other than the owner,
benefit from infrastructure (critical or not).
Whether we are talking about [museums],. transportation systems, the
electricity grid, ideas, environmental ecosystems, or Internet infrastructure, the
bulk of the social benefits generated by these resources derives from their
downstream uses. They create value downstream by serving a wide variety of
end-users who rely on access to them. Yet social demand for the infrastructure
itself is extremely difficult to measure.
See Frischmann,supra note 60, at 958.
82 Sales, supra note 12, at 1506.
83 Id.

OREGON LAW REVIEW

458

[Vol. 96, 441

its expenditures, it has weaker incentives to secure its systems. And
because other companies are able to free ride on the investing firm's
expenditures, they have weaker incentives to adopt defenses of their
own. 84

To the extent private entities underinvest in cybersecurity for CI,
negative externalities increase because the cost of a successful
cyberattack will be borne by numerous unrelated third parties.
Because the entity with weak cybersecurity will not bear all those
costs, the amount of investment in cybersecurity will not incorporate
the full, actual cost of potential harm. On the other hand, an optimal
amount of investment in cybersecurity will lead to increased positive
externalities because unrelated third parties will enjoy the benefits of
safe CI systems. However, any entity that invests an adequate amount
in cybersecurity will not be able to charge for the positive
externalities it generates.
II

A BRIEF REVIEW OF AMERICA'S CYBERSECURITY LAWS
So what is the state of America's law regarding the protection of
CI? One commentator described America's system of cybersecurity
laws as a patchwork of related laws, much of which is focused on data
breaches and privacy.8 5 The United States does not have a unified,
comprehensive approach to cybersecurity law and policy; the area is
addressed through the jurisdiction of a variety of federal agencies,
including the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of
Defense, the National Security Agency, and the Federal Trade
Commission. 8 6
84 Id. at 1520.
85 Jeff Kosseff, Positive CybersecurityLaw: Creatinga Consistentand Incentive-Based

System, 19 CHAP. L. REv. 401, 402 (2016).
86 Scott J. Shackelford et al., Bottoms Up: A Comparison of "Voluntary" Cybersecurity
Frameworks, 16 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 217, 221 (2016) [hereinafter Shackelford et al.,
"Voluntary" Cybersecurity Frameworks]. One commentator observed (in response to a
question about the state of U.S. cybersecurity law),
After pausing for far too long, I said, "We don't really have any oybersecurity
laws." What we have, instead, is a patchwork of related laws, including breach
notification and privacy statutes, that focus on penalizing companies for
inadequate data security. But our legal system lacks a coordinated network of
laws that are designed to promote cybersecurity and prevent data breaches from
occurring in the first place.
Kosseff, supra note 85, at 402. Kosseff added:
As discussed above, the United States does not have a cohesive cybersecurity
legal framework. Instead, it has a patchwork of laws that address some aspects of
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A starting point for a brief review of U.S. cybersecurity law is the
2014 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
Cybersecurity Framework (NIST Framework).
The goal of the
data security. These laws fail to work together harmoniously, occasionally
conflict, and do little to ensure the future security of data, networks, and systems.
The current legal system largely is backward-looking, and provides companies
and the public sector little guidance as to how to prevent future cybersecurity
incidents.
Id. at 406. Johnson shares this assessment: "Cyberspace is governed by a patchwork of
state, federal, and international regulations. Our fragmented regulatory framework,
characterized by industry-specific legislation, leaves significant gaps in the oversight of
cyberspace." Johnson, supra note 1, at 576. Other commentators note,
In the private sector, federal statutes relating to cybersecurity are typically
industry-specific and create general standards. In addition, the majority of these
cybersecurity statutes are directed at health care entities and financial institutions.
Again, while statutes were recently passed to facilitate private-public cooperation
in establishing cybersecurity standards across critical infrastructure industries,
they do not establish a comprehensive regulatory framework.
Daniel Garrie & Shane R. Reeves, An Unsatisfactory State of the Law: The Limited
Optionsfor a CorporationDealingwith Cyber Hostilities by State Actors, 37 CARDOzO L.
REv. 1827, 1839 (2016).
8 NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL

INFRASTRUCTuRE CYBERSECURITY (2014), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/docu
[hereinafter
NIST
ments/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf
FRAMEWORK]. The NIST Framework was developed pursuant to President Obama's
Executive Order 13636. Id. at 3. The Executive Summary opens by noting, "The national
and economic security of the United States depends on the reliable functioning of critical
infrastructure. Cybersecurity threats exploit the increased complexity and connectivity of
critical infrastructure systems, placing the Nation's security, economy, and public safety
and health at risk." Ia. at 1. The origins of cybersecurity law may be traced back to the
1986 U.S. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which criminalized unauthorized access and
damage to computers and networks. See Amanda N. Craig et al., Proactive Cybersecurity:
A Comparative Industry and Regulatory Analysis, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 721, 732 (2015).
Subsequent federal legislation addressing cybersecurity include "the E-Government Act of
2002, the Cybersecurity Research and Development Act of 2002, the Federal Information
Security Management Act of 2002, the Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002, the
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, and the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of
2014." Johnson, supra note 1, at 577. However, "no single piece of federal legislation
exists that addresses cybersecurity threats and issues." Id Another important piece of
legislation was the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001. 42 U.S.C. § 5195c
(2012). It states that it is the policy of the United States is to ensure
(1) that any physical or virtual disruption of the operation of the critical
infrastructures of the United States be rare, brief, geographically limited in effect,
manageable, and minimally detrimental to the economy, human and government
services, and national security of the United States;
(2) that actions necessary to achieve the policy stated in paragraph (1) be carried
out in a public-private partnership involving corporate and non-governmental
organizations; and
(3) to have in place a comprehensive and effective program to ensure the
continuity of essential Federal Government functions under all circumstances.
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NIST Framework is to guide "the development of a voluntary riskbased Cybersecurity Framework-a set of industry standards and best
practices to help organizations manage cybersecurity risks."8 8 Focus
should be placed on "voluntary." 89 One goal of the NIST Framework
is to promote the development of a standard of cybersecurity care in
the United States by incorporating private industry best practices. 90 It
seeks to encourage "a flexible and cost-effective approach to
enhancing cybersecurity by assisting owners and operators of critical
infrastructure in assessing and managing cyber risk." 9 1 Freedom and
flexibility are the bases of the NIST Framework. It does not establish
or prescribe the amount of cyber-risk the private sector should tolerate
in a given segment of their operations. Instead of developing an
entirely new set of standards, it "'relies on a variety of existing
standards, guidelines, and practices to enable critical infrastructure
providers to achieve resilience,' which allows the Framework to
'scale across borders, acknowledge the global nature of cybersecurity
risks, and evolve with technological advances and business
requirements."' 92 The NIST Framework pursues the much more
modest goal of providing a "common language" for entities to
evaluate their current cybersecurity needs and vulnerabilities,
determining the likelihood of attacks, and prioritizing opportunities
for internal and external stakeholders about cybersecurity risk. 93
At first glance, it may seem strange that such a vital aspect of
national security should be left to voluntary efforts by the private
sector. An alternative approach would have the federal government
set mandatory standards and requirements for the establishment and
implementation of cybersecurity protection of CI. However, there are
strong policy reasons that support a voluntary approach, and strong
arguments against mandatory federal requirements. First, the foremost
experts and leaders of innovation usually work in the private sector,
and technological advances often originate in the private sector. The

Id. § 5195c(c).
88 NIST FRAMEWORK, supra note 87, at 1.
89 See Shackelford et al., "Voluntary" Cybersecurity Frameworks, supra note 86, at
218 (describing America's protection of CI as "a largely voluntary approach through the
National Institute of Standards and Technology supplemented by sector-specific regulation
and U.S. Cyber Command").
90 See id. at 221.
91 Id. at 222.
92 Id. at 223.
93 Id.
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leaders of the private sector, as a group, have superior expertise and
knowledge to that of government officials.
Second, technology develops and improves at a rapid pace, so it is
likely that any set of mandatory regulations would be obsolete by the
time they become effective. The private owners of CI could find
themselves being forced to comply with outdated technology
standards when state of the art technology is available. 9 4 Basing CI
protection on a voluntary approach preserves the private sector's
freedom to improve as rapidly as the technology advances and avoids
problems created by inflexible or outdated regulatory requirements.9 5
With such policy considerations in mind, the NIST Framework
avoided imposing mandates on the private sector. Its Executive
Summary states,

94 A student note described the problem in this way:
However, the private sector is generally wary of additional cybersecurity laws or
regulations that might mandate specific standards or technology. The private
sector puts forth four main arguments against regulations and broadly-scoped
legislation. First, such requirements could increase business expenses and
overhead as well as misallocate company resources. Second, companies would
be forced to focus on compliance with measures that quickly become out-of-date
and ineffective, rather than on methods to address current and future threats.
Third, such requirements would disincentivize the public-private partnerships
that are already addressing the challenges. Fourth, the regulations would not
necessarily improve cybersecurity, particularly when the government does not
have a great track record for protecting against cyber breaches.
Chris Laughlin, Note, Cybersecurity in Critical Infrastructure Sectors: A Proactive
Approach to Ensure Inevitable Laws and Regulations are Effective, 14 COLO. TECH. L.J.
345, 357 (2016). Other commentators have noted that imposing mandatory requirements
on private entities regarding cybersecurity defenses would be counterproductive because
of the possibility that the government standards would be below the level of security
already implemented by private business. See Garrie & Reeves, supra note 86, at 1839
n.62.
95 See Shackelford et al., Global Cybersecurity, supra note 55, at 309. The ability to
respond rapidly to cyberthreats is crucial. CI owners suffer repeated cyberattacks, and
some electric utilities report being probed thousands of times each month. See Shackelford
et al., SustainableCybersecurity, supra note 14, at 2005-06.
Cybersecurity is in many ways an arms race between attackers and defenders.
ICT systems are very complex, and attackers are constantly probing for
weaknesses, which can occur at many points. Defenders can often protect against
weaknesses, but three are particularly challenging: inadvertent or intentional acts
by insiders with an access to a system; supply chain vulnerabilities, which can
permit the insertion of malicious software or hardware during the acquisition
processes and previously unknown, or zero-day, vulnerabilities with no
established fix. Even for vulnerabilities where remedies are known, they may not
be implemented in many cases because of budgetary or operational constraints.
FISCHER, supra note 2, at 2.
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The Framework enables organizations-regardless of size, degree
of cybersecurity risk, or cybersecurity sophistication-to apply the
principles and best practices of risk management to improving the
security and resilience of critical infrastructure ....
The Framework is not a one-size-fits-all approach to managing
cybersecurity risk for critical infrastructure. Organizations will
continue to have unique risks-different threats, different
vulnerabilities, different risk tolerances-and how they implement
the practices in the Framework will vary. Organizations can
determine activities that are important to critical service delivery
and can prioritize investments to maximize the impact of each
dollar spent. Ultimately, the Framework is aimed at reducing and
better managing cybersecurity risks. 9 6
By design, the NIST Framework provides a voluntary procedure for
private-sector entities to determine and implement cybersecurity best
practices without imposing regulatory requirements.9
This voluntary approach to protection of CI is embodied in recent
federal legislation addressing cybersecurity. The Cybersecurity Act of
2015 became law on December 18, 2015.98 It establishes a voluntary
information-sharing framework designed to encourage the private and
public sectors to share cyberthreat information." The Act instructs
the federal government "to establish procedures for sharing classified
and unclassified cyberthreat indicators and defensive measures with
the private sector." 1 00 The Department of Homeland Security is
responsible for creating a mechanism for the government to receive
notifications of cyberthreat indicators and defensive measures from
the private sector and then sharing that information with other
government entities.' 0 1 The emphasis on public-private sector
cooperation makes sense and is necessary given the public-private
nature of the Internet itself. The open architecture of the Internet
makes it pointless to try to isolate or draw clear lines between private
sector concerns and public sector concerns.1 0 2
Title I of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 contains the Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA).1 03 The purpose of CISA is
96 NIST FRAMEWORK, supra note 87, at 1-2.
97 See Shackelford et al., Global Cybersecurity, supra note 55, at 308-09.
98 Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242 (2015).
99 See Kelly Russo & Harvey Rishikof, Cybersecurity: Executive Orders, Legislation,
Cyberattacks, andHot Topics, 19 CHAP. L. REv. 421, 433 (2016).
100

Id.

101 Id.
102 Kosseff, supra note 85, at 404.
103 6 U.S.C. § 1501 (2012) ("This title [enacting this subchapter ...
. may be cited as
the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015."). The Cybersecurity Act of 2015
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to improve cybersecurity defenses in the United States by creating "a
voluntary cybersecurity information sharing exchange designed to
encourage public and private-sector actors to share cyber threat
information." 104 CISA is designed to facilitate and promote "the
timely sharing of . .. cyber threat indicators and defensive measures
in the possession of the Federal Government with . . . non-Federal
entities." 0 5 CISA makes clear, however, that private-sector
involvement is voluntary. 0 6 It provides, "Nothing in this subchapter
shall be construed to permit a Federal entity . . . to require a nonFederal entity to provide information to a Federal entity or another
It further provides, "Nothing in this
non-Federal entity . . . ."
subchapter shall be construed to subject any entity to liability for
choosing not to engage in the voluntary activities authorized in this
subchapter." 0 8 The text expressly and repeatedly emphasizes the
voluntary nature of the legislation.

contains four titles. Title I addresses the private sector and establishes a centralized
mechanism for information sharing. Title II instructs DHS to improve cybersecurity within
the federal government and to implement Title I. Title III calls for a cybersecurity
assessment of the federal workforce. Title IV provides for other measures related to threats
to critical information systems and networks. Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114113, 129 Stat. 2242.
10 See Johnson, supranote 1, at 578.
"Information sharing is one of the most potent tools we have to counter
malicious cyber activity," Julia Philipp, deputy director for cyber intelligence and
head of the financial sector Cyber Intelligence Group at the U.S. Department of
the Treasury, said at a recent conference. "Malicious cyber actors share
information and tools used to exploit our systems every day; we should be doing
the same to stop them."
See Sean McMahon, Four Keys to Winning the Cyber Arms Race, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20,
2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/vault/blog/four-keys-to-winning-the-cyber-arms-race/.
105 6 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(1) (2012). A "non-Federal entity" includes "any private entity."
Id. § 1501(14)(A). A private entity "means any person or private group, organization,
proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or
nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent thereof." Id. § 1501(15)(A).
106 "It is important to note that CISA is strictly voluntary, i.e., there is no duty to share.
It expressly prohibits the federal government from coercing parties into sharing. It also
provides a safe harbor for participating entities, when they share information according to
CISA's provisions. . . ." Jasper L. Tran, Navigating the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, 19
CHAP. L. REv. 483, 486 (2016).
107 6 U.S.C. § 1507(h)(1).
10 Id. § 1507(i).
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III
THE ADVANTAGES TO A VOLUNTARY APPROACH TO PROTECTION OF

CI
There are millions of connections to the Internet, through a wide
range of devices. The parties connected to the Internet include private
individuals, small businesses, large businesses, and governments. The
parties that make Internet-connected products are similarly diverse.
Given this wide range, it seems prudent to avoid seeking a strict
regulatory regime to govern all users, providers, and beneficiaries of
CI connected to the Internet. There are clearly dangers of regulatory
overreach when trying to fashion a coherent set of rules to apply to
such a wide range, and conventional regulatory schemes may be
ineffective. The nature of the Internet and cyberspace poses unique
challenges.
Cyberspace, by its very architecture, is a network of both
private-sector and public-sector infrastructure. Unlike traditional
regulatory area, such as food safety, where the government is more
than an overseer of the private sector, the government is a partner
with the private sector. The government developed the initial
infrastructure of the Internet, and the private sector invested billions
of dollars to build that initial infrastructure into the transformative
force that it is today. Accordingly, unlike other areas, in which
traditional top-down regulation is effective, cybersecurity requires a
different mindset. Cybersecurity requires a continuation of the
partnership between the government and companies. Indeed, an
insecure Internet harms the private sector by slowing the growth
and progress of the Internet; it is in the best interests of every
company to work with the government for a more secure
cyberspace. 109
Thus, the nature of the public-private relationship is actually like a
partnership:1 1 0 partners need to work together, and one partner does
not have the authority to command another partner.
One commentator has advanced several arguments against a
mandatory regulatory regime, such as (1) cyberattacks do not pose an
existential threat, (2) there are means other than regulation (such as
subsidies and liability risks) to address cybersecurity, (3) regulations
cannot keep up with the pace of technological advances, (4) no
federal agency is suitable for leading a regulatory response, (5)

109 Kosseff supra note 85, at 411-12.

110 The Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 actually uses the word
"partnership" to describe the public-private relationship regarding cybersecurity. 42 U.S.C.
§ 5195c(c)(2) (2012).
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lawmakers do not understand the nature of cybersecurity threats, (6)
there are regulations already in place, and (7) American regulation
will disrupt the global nature of the Internet."' These points raise a
variety of issues, many of which are beyond the scope of this Article.
However, they present colorable arguments in favor of a "voluntary"
approach.
One point, in particular, is the inability to compare the cost versus
benefit of increased cybersecurity. If the government is unable to
calculate the benefit, it makes it difficult to justify requiring private
entities to invest in a mandatory level of cybersecurity. Even a strong
proponent of regulation, Professor Jack Goldsmith at Harvard,
concedes that it is not possible to measure the cost of cybersecurity
regulation versus the benefits.1 2 Another scholar agrees that the
benefits of cybersecurity and risks of cyberattacks are "impossible to

II' See Paul Rosenzweig, The Unpersuasiveness of the Case for Cybersecurity
Regulation-An Introduction, LAWFARE BLOG (May 17, 2012, 12:35 PM), https://www.
lawfareblog.com/unpersuasiveness-case-cybersecurity-regulation-%E2%80%93-introduc
tion. In his opposition to regulation, Mr. Rosenzweig argues: (1) More regulation is not
necessary because cyber vulnerabilities of CI are not an existential threat; (2) Regulation is
not the only way that governments deal with externalities. They can also be addressed
through other means like subsidies, taxes, and the imposition of liability; (3) Regulation is
an especially poor choice for use in a dynamic and changing environment where existing
performance standards will almost certainly be irrelevant within a few years; (4) No
Federal agency is suitable or designed to lead a comprehensive regulatory effort; (5)
Regulations already exist in this sphere and have not been particularly effective; and (6)
Additional federal regulation may have significant adverse effects on Internet governance,
along with adverse cross-border effects. Id These views are one side of the coin, and there
are equally compelling counterarguments. For example, it seems surprising that anyone
would doubt the existential threat posed by attacks on cyber vulnerabilities. President
Obama did not seem to have such doubts.
Much of our critical infrastructure-our financial systems, our power grid, health
systems-run on networks connected to the Internet, which is hugely
empowering but also dangerous, and creates new points of vulnerability that we
didn't have before. Foreign governments and criminals are probing these systems
every single day. We only have to think of real-life examples-an air traffic
control system going down and disrupting flights, or blackouts that plunge cities
into darkness-to imagine what a set of systematic cyber attacks might do. So
this is also a matter of public safety.
Obama, supra note 62.
112 Jack Goldsmith, Response to Paul on Cyber-Regulationfor CriticalInfrastructure,
LAWFARE BLOG (May 21, 2012, 12:11 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/response-paul
-cyber-regulation-critical-infrastructure ("in truth I do not know how to assess the costs of
regulation versus the costs of non-regulation, and I have not seen any good analysis of that
crucial issue in this context. Nor do I think such an analysis will be forthcoming, because
so much information is classified, and because metrics are very hard in this context.").
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measure precisely."' 1 3 If this is indeed the case, then cybersecurity
presents a highly challenging area to regulate because of the
unknowability of benefits versus costs. 1 14 Because of the uncertainty
over the benefits, efficacy, and effect on technological progress,
perhaps the prudent course is to start with a, voluntary, bottom-up
approach.' 1 5 There seem to be too many open questions regarding
cost, benefit, and implementation for effective regulation. For
example, the cost of a strong regulatory regime can partly be
measured in dollar cost of things like upgrades, and compliance and
legal fees. However, what is the corresponding dollar benefit? If the
cost and benefit cannot be compared, how would a government justify
a strong regulatory response?' 16 The problem is aggravated if the cost
113 Lawrence A. Gordon, Univ. of Md., Speaker at the International NCSC ONE
Conference 2015: Investing in Cybersecurity: Insights from the Gordon-Loeb Model 4
(Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/files/Documents/SignatureEventsConfer
encesSymposiumsEventsNotSpecificToACenter/IBMWorkshop/2015/gordon.pdf.
114 A cost-benefit analysis is a fundamental principle of administrative rulemaking.
Cost-benefit analysis has . . . been elevated to the top of the administrative
agenda by presidential orders that have tried to make comparison of costs and
benefits a central element of federal regulation. On February 17, 1981, President
Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291. It provides detailed procedures for
issuance of so-called major regulations by executive branch regulatory agencies.
All such agencies are required to prepare regulatory-impact analyses when they
promulgate major rules. They must analyze the costs and benefits of the proposed
regulations, and they are required to "maximize the net benefits to society." If the
least-cost alternative has not been selected, the agencies are required to explain
why.
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 178 (3d ed. 1991). Thus, agencies are
required to prepare a report on the costs and benefits of proposed regulations pursuant to
presidential Executive Orders, and this is a generally accepted part of the administrative
process. See PIERCE, JR. ET AL., supra note 75, at 86, 87, 434. However, only a few
statutes expressly require an agency to prove that the benefits of a regulation exceed the
costs. Id. at 437. Moreover, Congress has frequently rejected the use of cost-benefit
analysis in many areas of heavily-regulated law. Id. at 435.
115 The problem with a top-down approach was described this way:
Too often government regulates through rigid commands, precluding industries
from using more flexible and cost-effective measures that achieve the same
goals. For example, in air and water pollution control, the rigid "best available
technology" approach, which mandates control technologies for hundreds or
even thousands of firms, gives industries little incentive to improve existing
pollution control technologies. Incentive-based systems could save billions of
dollars. Yet in spite of the potential advantages, efforts to seek better regulatory
tools are hobbled by the statutory status quo, which either forbids such tools or
engrafts them onto a bureaucratically complex system.
Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, ConstitutionalMoments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN.
L. REv. 247, 260 (1996).
116 There is, of course, the case against over-reliance on cost-benefit analysis.
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of strong regulation acts as an impediment to technological advances.
In that situation, the costs could dangerously outweigh the benefits.' 1 7
There is also uncertainty regarding both the extent and likelihood of
harm. A cost-benefit analysis would need to factor in whether CI
vulnerabilities pose an existential threat to systems, social order, and
lives. If so, what is the likelihood of such a successful attack? Or is
any attack on CI manageable, even if the likelihood of success is
higher? These are necessary issues that need to be addressed when
considering the type, extent, and strength of regulatory requirements.
At a minimum, a basic expected value analysis would be one of the
first steps. This type of analysis determines the likelihood of a
particular threat and then multiplies that by the amount of estimated
harm. However, if it is impracticable to supply reliable numbers into
this calculation, then any result is unhelpful. It would be imprudent to
impose regulatory mandates based on indeterminable data.
Governments around the world confront the same issues regarding
cybersecurity, and many have arrived at the same conclusion as the
United States in not adopting top-down, command regulatory

regimes. 1 18
Supporters of regulation counter that benefits do exceed costs for health and
safety and environmental regulation, that a cost-benefit standard is an
inappropriate measure of whether there should be regulation because it is
extremely uncertain and biased, and that many forms of regulation have equitable
goals which cannot be measured in economic terms.
PIERCE, JR. ET AL., supra note 75, at 16.
117 The danger of unintended effects is an inherent risk in any regulatory scheme.
Many regulatory initiatives result in harmful unintended consequences. Under
the existing regulatory system, there is no systematic way to ensure that those
consequences receive attention. Hence regulation tends to be based on partial
perspectives that emerge from close attention to mere pieces of complex
problems. This myopic approach ignores the importance of ensuring that
regulation does not have unexplored side-effects or increase harms or risks on
balance.
Sunstein, supra note 115, at 261-62. This passage neatly describes the problem regarding
cybersecurity regulation. The need for a stronger legal framework may be driven by
anecdotal accounts of well-publicized data breaches, as opposed to a systemic study of the
problem. Indeed, it is frustrating that experts cannot even agree if cyberattacks pose
existential threats.
118 See Shackelford et al.,."Voluntary" Cybersecurity Frameworks, supra note 86, at

218-19.
The Cybersecurity Framework takes a risk-based approach for organizations to
detect, mitigate, and respond to cyber threats. Rather than developing new
cybersecurity standards and risk management processes, the Cybersecurity
Framework "relies on a variety of existing standards, guidelines, and practices to
enable critical infrastructure providers to achieve resilience," which allows the
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Another advantage of a voluntary approach is that it provides
flexibility and the ability to adapt rapidly to new threats. Cyberattacks
and cybersecurity are not static concepts. The creation of new forms
of threats are limited only by the imagination of the hackers. As' soon
as cybersecurity experts can thwart a particular type of threat, new
threats will spring up to evade the newly developed defenses. This
cycle of attack and response is like an infinite loop. It would be
extremely difficult for a "hard" regulatory approach based on topdown mandates by the federal government to adapt at the speed
necessary to match the ongoing battle between hackers and
cybersecurity defenses.
Other incentives encourage the development of strong
cybersecurity defenses. Lawsuits from highly publicized breaches
provide one form of incentive. For example, Target paid $39 million
to settle a class action lawsuit resulting from the cybersecurity breach
of its customers' personal information.119 Sony paid nearly $8 million
to settle a lawsuit filed by employees whose personal information was
stolen through a cyberattack. 1 2 0 Thus, America's tort system provides
Framework to "scale across borders, acknowledge the global nature of
cybersecurity risks, and evolve with technological advances and business
requirements." The Cybersecurity Framework provides a "common language"
for entities to evaluate their current cybersecurity posture, determine their
targeted state for cybersecurity, prioritize opportunities for improvement, assess
progress toward their targeted state, and establish sufficient methods of
communication among internal and external stakeholders about cybersecurity
risk.
Shackelford et al., Global Cybersecurity, supra note 55, at 329-30 (quoting NIST
FRAMEWORK, supra note 87, at 1).
The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 obligated NIST to coordinate
with industry leaders and critical infrastructure owners to facilitate and support
the development of an industry-led set of standards and procedures to reduce
cyber risks to critical infrastructure. Part of the Act requires NIST to consult with
government agencies in an attempt to coordinate the cybersecurity efforts
between public and private sectors. The Act further requires NIST to work with
industry leaders to "identify a prioritized, flexible, repeatable, performancebased, and cost-effective" set of standards that "owners and operators of critical
infrastructure" can adopt to help "identify, assess, and manage cyber risks."
Garrie & Reeves, supra note 86, at 1845 (quoting Cybersecurity Enhancement Act, 15
U.S.C. § 272(e)(1)(A)(ii) (2012)).
119 Ahiza Garcia, Target Settles for $39 Million over Data Breach, CNNMONEY (Dec.
2, 2015, 5:48 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/02/news/companies/target-data-breach
-settlement/.
120 Nate Raymond, Sony Settles Employees' Suit Over 'The Interview'DataBreach for
$8 Million, INS. J. (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2015
/10/21/385672.htm. This breach arose in connection with Sony's release of the movie, The
Interview, which was a comedy set in North Korea. Id.
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a layer of incentive to bolster cybersecurity. There are problems,
however, with relying on tort law. First, if damages are at issue, it
means the harm has already occurred. Tort law may compensate
victims after harm has occurred, but it may not sufficiently
incentivize the development of preventative measures. Second, tort
law does not solve the problem of negative externalities. If an electric
utility has weak cyberdefenses and is breached, not all persons
affected by the power loss will be able to prove proximate causation.
Thus, the utility will not bear all the loss caused by its inadequate
cyberdefenses. Finally, the country may not want to rely on the tort
system to prevent catastrophic attacks.
Thus, the question remains whether current law results in adequate
cybersecurity. Given the numerous issues involved, a voluntary
approach may be the most prudent, least disruptive course to take.
However, there are obvious problems with this approach.
IV
THE DISADVANTAGES TO A VOLUNTARY APPROACH TO PROTECTION
OF CI

Widely accepted economic theory tells us that the free market will
result in an undersupply of public goods. There are two reasons for
the significant underinvestment in cybersecurity protection of CI.
Because private businesses are profit driven, they will produce only
those goods from which they can earn a profit. As a result, they will
not produce public goods because public goods are nonexcludable. 12 1
In other words, the positive externalities enjoyed by third parties
generated by investment in cybersecurity cannot be captured as profit
by the provider of the cybersecurity. A supplier of a public good (like
cybersecurity of CI) cannot exclude free riders or force them to
pay.1 2 2 A free market is unable to provide a profit incentive for the
production or supply of public goods. The other side of this coin is
that entities that own CI do not bear the full cost of an
underinvestment in cybersecurity because much of the cost will be
borne by unrelated third parties. Even self-interest in self-protection
does not provide adequate economic incentives in the case of
protection of CI. An electric utility may calculate that in the event of a
cyberattack that destroys power generation equipment, it will incur a
certain cost to repair the damage. However, the cost of repair does not
121

See Public Goods Podcast, supranote 64.

122

Id.
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capture the external costs to all the customers who suffer from a
power outage. For these reasons, there will likely be underinvestment
in cybersecurity:1 2 3
"Many companies that operate critical infrastructure tend to
underinvest in cyber-defense because of negative externalities,
positive externalities, free riding, and public goods problems-the
same sorts of challenges the modern administrative state encounters
in a variety of other contexts."1 24
The market, by itself, is unable to provide sufficient incentives for
an optimal amount of spending on cybersecurity. A report by a
leading consulting firm seems to confirm this conclusion. According
to the report, global cybersecurity spending was expected to reach an
all-time high of $76.9 billion in 2015.125 However, the majority of IT
executives anticipated receiving only half of the funding necessary to
execute their preferred security strategies.1 2 6 The report highlighted
the problem of this underfunding. It went on to state that U.S.
businesses encounter approximately 1.7 successful cyberattacks per
week and incur annual costs of $12.7 million per business to address
the impacts.1 2 7 The frequency, complexity, and costs associated with
123

Sales observes,

If this analysis is correct, then strategically significant firms in uncompetitive
markets are less likely to adequately invest in cyber-security than ordinary firms
in competitive markets. The question then becomes who should be responsible
for securing these most sensitive companies against the most dangerous
adversaries. Economists often argue that risk should be allocated to the low cost
avoider. If the government can reduce a vulnerability more efficiently than a
firm, it should pay; if the firm can reduce a vulnerability more efficiently, it
should pay. But there is no single low cost avoider in this context. Defending
critical infrastructure against sophisticated cyber-attackers is a task that features
dueling comparative advantages. Private firms typically know more than
outsiders, including the government, about the architecture of their systems, so
they often are in a better position to know about weaknesses that intruders might

exploit. The private sector thus has a comparative advantage at identifying cybervulnerabilities. On the other hand, the government's highly skilled intelligence
agencies typically know more than the private sector about malware used by
foreign governments and about how to defeat it. The government thus has a
comparative advantage at detecting sophisticated attacks and developing
countermeasures. This suggests that responsibility for defending the most
sensitive systems against the most sophisticated adversaries should be shared.
Sales, supra note 12, at 1517-18.
124 Id. at 1507.
125 BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, CYBER ROI: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO QUANTIFYING
THE FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF CYBERSECURITY 1 (2015).
126 Id.
127 Id.
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attacks are increasing, but the report concludes that many
organizations are reluctant to increase cybersecurity spending because
they are unable to accurately quantify the financial value of
prospective investments. 12 8
The problem is compounded by the vulnerabilities of smaller
companies that are linked to a larger company. Returning to the
example of the Boeing 777 from this Article's introduction, even if it
is assumed that Boeing correctly assessed the risk to its systems and
invested the right amount in cybersecurity defense, the same may not
be true for the hundreds of suppliers who supply the parts that go into
the aircraft. For example, suppose a small company provides parts for
the in-flight entertainment system and assume that the parts are
accessible to the Internet. Does that small supplier have sufficient
incentive to invest properly in cybersecurity when the monetary
damage to it of a cyberattack on its parts is tiny compared to the
possible harm that may occur if the safety of the aircraft is breached
by an attack through the in-flight entertainment system? Does a small
supplier have the money to invest in increased cybersecurity? Boeing
may have a large budget to devote to it, but what about the hundreds
of smaller companies in the supply chain? 129
The financial costs faced by small vendors to larger businesses is
exemplified by the challenges that threaten law firms. Law firms are
part of CI systems because they are linked to clients who operate CI.
The owners and operators of CI systems are vulnerable to threats and
breaches initiated through attacks on their law firms.130 The

128 Id.

129 See Shackelford & Russell, Above the Cloud, supra note 47, at 641 (discussing this
hypothetical threat).
The proverbial "weak link" in the chain of CI could result in catastrophic
economic damage, which is compounded by the sheer number of access points
that cyber attackers may exploit. Government contractors, private-sector actors,
public-sector organizations, utilities companies, and so on, all have separate
regulators, differing cybersecurity standards, and long supply chains.
Id. The use of everyday, seemingly innocuous devices to cripple the Internet has already
happened. In October 2016, there was a massive distributed denial of service attack that
shut down major websites. Hackers used hundreds of thousands of web-connected devices
such as webcams and DVRs to launch the cyberattack. See Sam Thielman & Elle Hunt,
Cyber Attack: Hackers 'Weaponised' Everyday Devices with Malware, GUARDIAN (Oct.
22, 2016, 1:47 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/22/cyber-attack
-hackers-weaponised-everyday-devices-with-malware-to-mount-assault.
130 See Julie Sobowale, Large or Small, Law Firms are Learning They Must Deal with
Cybersecurity, 103 A.B.A. J. 34, 36 (2017). Law firms have suffered theft of money frbm
their bank accounts, theft of confidential client information for use in illegal trading, and
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vulnerabilities are widely acknowledged, but the response has been
slow due to the high financial cost of improving cybersecurity
defenses.1 3 1 The simple but necessary step of upgrading software
poses a financial problem for many firms, and this cost generally
cannot be passed on to clients. 13 2 Law firms are a typical provider or
supplier to the larger businesses that own CI systems, and there is no
reason to think that the financial problems for law firms are unique to
them. Thus, studies in these areas produce expected findings.
The studies found that many firms regard cyber-security as little
more than "a last box they have to check," and that they neglect
network security because they find it too expensive. In particular,
McAfee [a provider of cybersecurity software] found that
companies often have weak authentication requirements-tools that
can verify that the person who is accessing a system is who he says
he is, and is authorized to access the system. Even fewer have
systems that can monitor network activity and identify anomalies.
Other studies reveal that some companies' defenses are so poor they
don't even know when they've suffered an attack. 13 3
Cybersecurity for CI relies on financial investments by private
parties in their systems. Even assuming that all private parties
understand the importance of cybersecurity, they may not have the
money to spend on it. 1 34
V
A MODEST PROPOSAL TO BOLSTER CYBERSECURITY DEFENSES

The traditional approach to increasing public goods such as
cybersecurity is well known.. The government can play its traditional
role as the provider or facilitator.13 5 The government has a unique
role because it does not face the same problems as private businesses
that need a profit incentive.1 36 The government has taken the first
disclosure of confidential documents in the notorious Panama Papers incident, all through
cyberattacks. Id. at 40-41.
131 Id. at 36.
132 Id.

133 Sales, supra note 12, at 1512.
134 See Tran, supra note 106, at 483, 486.
135 "So how do we get public goods? The government steps in. Unlike a private firm,
the government has no profit motive. And the government reduces the free rider problem
by collecting taxes from consumers to help fund public goods." Public Goods Podcast,
supra note 64.
136 Frischmann's article states,
In other words, it is generally accepted that the market will fail in one way or
another to efficiently provide society with infrastructure and that there is some
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steps of creating a voluntary framework. However, there is more that
can be done. To this end, this Article proposes a modest, incremental
expansion of the government's role that builds on the voluntary
framework. The continued interaction between the private and public
sectors remains crucial because each has its own areas of advantages
the other side lacks.
A significant barrier to improvement in cybersecurity is the cost,
and cost is likely to be a more challenging issue for smaller firms. 1 3 7
To address this problem, the federal government could subsidize, in
whole or part, upgrades to cybersecurity defenses. 13 8 Government
subsidization is a traditional response to encourage the production of
public goods.1 39 The appeal of subsidies in this particular area is that
the federal government already subsidizes protection of CI. The
proposal is to simply expand subsidies already authorized by
Congress to include more private entities.
Federal legislation to encourage private-sector protection of CI
systems is already in place. For example, Title 10 of the United States
Code includes the following provision:
role for government intervention . . . . The question then becomes one of
comparative institutional analysis: how should the government modify or
regulate the market?
Frischmann, supra note 60, at 940. He adds, "[c]ritically, many infrastructure resources act
as inputs into a wide variance of socially valuable activities, including the production of
public goods and nonmarket goods. These activities generate significant social welfare
gains that are generally associated with traditional infrastructure, yet underappreciated
with respect to nontraditional infrastructure." Id. at 932.
137 See Robert Gyenes, Note, A Voluntary Cybersecurity Framework is UnworkableGovernment Must Crack the Whip, 14 U. PITr. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 293, 295 (2014)
(claiming that voluntary policy "creates a financial burden on the target 'critical'
infrastructure without providing a solution"). "In part.because the government doesn't
provide any funding, businesses have decided not to invest in new secure facilities and
network upgrades to handle classified data." Id. at 305. "Under the current Framework,
companies are left to wonder how they will finance any voluntary cyber improvements
without incentives. Corporations failing to invest in cybersecurity often cite budget
constraints as 'the number one challenge to contributing to the [cybersecurity] levels the
business expects."' Id. at 311.
138 See Goldsmith, supra note 112 (explaining that subsidies may be considered as one
of many forms of government regulation).
Regulation can serve the public interest in two ways. First, it can address
"market failure" or the absence of one or more of the factors necessary for an
efficient market. A private market is "efficient" when it produces only those
goods and services most desired by consumers. Second, regulation is justified on
the ground that the outcome of markets is inconsistent with important collective
social values other than economic efficiency.
PIERCE, JR. ET AL., supra note 75, at 13-14.
139 See Sales, supra note 12, at 1519.
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In order to meet the national security objectives in section 2501(a)
of this title, the Secretary of Defense shall establish a program
under which the Secretary may issue guarantees assuring lenders
against losses of principal or interest, or both principal and interest,
for loans made to qualified commercial firms to fund, in whole or in
part, any of the following activities:
(1) The improvement of the protection of the critical infrastructure
of the commercial firms.
(2) The refinancing of improvements previously made- to the
protection of critical infrastructure of the commercial firms. 14 0
The necessity for this statute was spurred by national defense
issues, and this Article referenced the DOD's interim final rule
requiring contractors to meet certain NIST standards. In responding to
that rule, the Small Business Administration (SBA) raised the issue of
the financial burdens faced by small businesses in upgrading
cybersecurity. To ease the burden, the SBA recommended "that DOD
consider alternatives, such as collaborating with universities or other
organizations to provide low-cost cybersecurity services to small
businesses, or providing a one-time subsidy to small businesses to
help cover the cost of initial consultations with third-party
vendors." 1 4 1
This Article proposes the expansion of subsidies beyond matters
under the jurisdiction of the DOD so that other CI systems receive
government support. The fact that Congress and the DOD already
have a subsidy program in place for CI should be viewed as strong
support for the case in favor of subsidies and is a clear indication that
Congress recognizes the need for such financial support for the
private sector. A main problem seems to be that such programs are
not available for all CI systems.
CONCLUSION

This Article's proposal depends on federal budget issues and
political will. 14 2 However, if the country is to maintain a voluntary

§ 2541(a) (2012).
141 See SBA, Opinion Letter on Interim Rule, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement: Network Penetration Reporting and Contracting for Cloud Services (Feb. 29,
2016), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/DFARS-security-interim-commentletter
.pdf.
142 This Article focuses on economic problems in the form of market failure as
obstacles to optimal protection of CI. However, a more complete discussion requires
acknowledgement of the political obstacles as well. Some powerful businesses in the
private sector oppose government efforts to strengthen cybersecurity defenses and spend
millions of dollars in lobbying efforts to resist such efforts. See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra
140 10 U.S.C.
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approach to cybersecurity, it seems any improved approach will
necessarily include expanded subsidization to assist the private sector.
The government's existing legislation acknowledges the merits of
subsidies for CI. Because the use of subsidies to protect CI already
has congressional approval in some instances, an increase in the role
of subsidies deserves further consideration. In enacting the Critical
Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001, Congress found that "[p]rivate
business, government, and the national security apparatus
increasingly depend on an interdependent network of critical physical
and information infrastructures, including telecommunications,
energy, financial services, water, and transportation sectors." 4 3 In
order to ensure full and optimal participation by the private sector,
some sort of government support is necessary. Otherwise, the public
good nature of cybersecurity of CI will continue to frustrate optimal
protection.
Government support is especially vital because the cybersecurity
battle changes constantly. As soon as one threat is addressed, another
replaces it. Defense requires constant monitoring and response, and
the cost to the private sector is significant. Experts in the area know
the nature of the problems. However, the problems are extremely
difficult to quantify. How much is the right amount of spending on
cybersecurity? What is the likelihood of any particular kind of attack,
and what is the estimated amount of resulting damage? How does one
go about determining numbers like this? Private businesses cannot
afford to ovetspend on a low-risk problem, but they also expose
themselves if they underspend on a high-risk problem. Additionally,

note 37, at 137-43 (discussing Microsoft's lobbying efforts). In addition to the influence
of money on the political process, politicians themselves may also be obstacles. This is
Clarke's description of the situation:
Congress is a federation of fiefdoms, subject to the vicissitudes of constant fund
raising and the lobbying of those who have donated the funds. That situation has
two adverse consequences with regard to congressional involvement in cyber war
oversight. First, everyone wants his or her own fiefdom. Congress has resisted
any suggestion, such as was made by Senator Bob Bennett (Republican of Utah),
that there be one committee authorized to examine cyber security.. . . Second,
Congress 'eschews regulation' and spits it out. The influential donors from the
information technology, electric power, pipeline, and telecommunications
industries have made the idea of serious cyber security regulations as remote as
public financing of congressional campaigns or meaningful limits on campaign
contributions.
Id. at 263. Of course, this is one person's personal opinion. Yet, it is an opinion that
deserves consideration.
143 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(b)(2) (2012).
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private businesses may not be positioned to be able to assess the risk
or likelihood of an attack. A proposal for increased subsidization is a
mild response to the nature of the problem. However, if there was a
better solution, it would probably already be in place. At a minimum,
the goal of this Article is to increase awareness of the problems and
the threat potentials, as reliance on the Internet continues to grow.

